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The motivation to undertake an analytical scrutiny of
the EIA rules in Zambia derives from the controversial
decision to approve the establishment of a large scale
open-pit mine (the Kangaluwi Copper Mine) in the
Lower Zambezi National Park. This matter raised a
lot of controversy and a public outcry that also made
international news headlines.1 Environmental
organizations like Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF)
Zambia, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), a host
of individual environmentalists and high profiled
Zambian citizens, drawing upon their Constitutional
rights,2 led a public campaign against the development.
A group of individual activists even attempted to halt
this development through litigation in what became a
protracted court case which was thrown out by the
Lusaka High Court on a technicality.3 By the time of
writing this article, the appeal against the High Court
dismissal was also thrown out by the Court of Appeal.
On behalf  of  the Lower Zambezi Tourism
Association, an evaluation report was published in
which a number of flaws were identified in the approval
of the mining project, inter alia, critical legislative and
policy gaps in the evaluation, approval and
management of mining within protected areas in
Zambia.4 The comments and opinions that
characterized the public protest against this
development revealed a number of sentiments; some
Zambians have interpreted the approval as an act of
political interference in the regulatory business of the
Zambia Environmental Management Agency
(ZEMA), CSOs have accused government of
prioritizing economic development at the expense of
environmental protection, while others see the
controversial decision as a capacity weakness on the
regulator’s part – describing the Zambia
Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) as a
lion that roars but does not bite.
Meanwhile, some legal scholarly experts have called
for a review of the EIA rules particularly owing to a
number of omissions, mistakes and errors inherent
in the rules.5 While this paper considers the said
omissions, errors and mistakes as part of the broad
array of  challenges in Zambia’s EIA process, the narrow
focus of analysis in this paper is on the form and
character of the rules, the subjective regulatory culture
created by the rules in practice, and the controversial
approval system that emerges out of this subjective
regulatory culture. The authors propose that, the
mischief of regulatory subjectivity in the current rules
should be cured or they may be carried forward in the
proposed new set of EIA regulations. Such a
perpetuation would be likened to pouring old wine in
new skins.
The Lower Zambezi case is neither the first nor the
last case of the sort exemplifying such controversies.
It features in the introduction herein only because the
case raised the highest level of controversial EIA
approvals ever seen in Zambia; and as such, it becomes
the first case in which the approval was legally
challenged in a protracted litigation to the height of
the Court of Appeal. This paper is not a case
commentary on the Lower Zambezi case, which, by
the time of writing this article had been dismissed on
appeals technicalities, for the second time, but this
time by the Court of Appeal. Nothing in this paper
should be construed as advancing an argument in
support of, or in antagonism to, the development of
large-scale open-pit mining operations in a national
park. Rather, the paper attempts to analyze the root
of such controversies and further demonstrate that
such controversies in the EIA approval system will be
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1  Cecilia Jasmine (The Mining Intelligence), ‘Zambia Scraps
Plans to Build Giant Copper Mine in National Park’
<https://www.mining.com/zambia-scraps-plans-to-
build-giant-copper-mine-in-national-park/>.
2  The Constitution of  Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of
2016, Art 256.
3  Vincent Ziba and Five others vs the Attorney General
and Mwembeshi Resources Limited (2019) HCZ 2014/
HP/A006.
4  Kelly Leigh, Evaluation Report: Kangaluwi Open-pit
Copper Mine in the Lower Zambezi National Park (Lower
Zambezi Tourism Association, November 2014) 4.
5 Proceed Munatsa, ‘The Law and Practice of
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) in Zambia:
Strengths and Weaknesses’ (2015) VI (6) International
Journal of Politics and Good Governance 1-9, 8.
inevitable for as long as the current subjectivity in the
rules subsist.
The analysis proceeds in the first part to explain the
statutory foundations of EIAs in Zambia. More than
just a mere descriptive narrative of this foundation,
the paper analyzes how the culture of regulatory
subjectivity is bred right from the statutory
foundations of EIAs. In the second part, the paper
delves into the gist of the matter to undertake a critical
examination of the substantive EIA rules themselves,
the pre-authorization mechanism and the subjective
regulatory culture that emerges out of this mechanism
in the practice of EIAs. That public participation is a
crucial part of the approval process, the third part
involves analysis of the different values of public
participation in EIAs from a Constitutional, statutory,
regulatory and case law perspective. In essence, the
paper attempts to demonstrate how the subjective
clash of values in the EIA process impairs public
participation. The paper concludes with a reiteration
of its locus classicus; that EIA controversies and the
contested approvals that flow from the process are
themselves symptomatic of the subjectivity in the EIA
rules.
In theory, the EIA rules are ostensibly comprehensive
with respect to their object and scope. This aspect of
EIA administration in Zambia was lauded as a
strength in the legal scholarly analysis by Proceed
Munatsa in 2015.6 But with a much deeper focus on
the form of the rules mirrored against actual EIA
practices on the ground, it is found that these rules
create a highly subjective approval system bereft of
objective scientific standards of regulation. In effect,
Munatsa rightly observes that EIAs in practice are not
as ‘effective’ as they are ostensibly presented on paper.7
Effectiveness in the context of this analysis is in
reference to the extent to which EIAs in Zambia can
enforce the precautionary and prevention principles
of environmental law within the object of
environmental management.8
As such, the paper proposes that the subjectivity in
the approval system can be cured through standards
that set scientific criteria for decision-making rather than
a reliance on opinion-based comments and value-based
judgements. The authors hope that the proposed new
set of EIA regulations will cure the mischief of
subjectivity in the current rules if not to overhaul them
completely. Specifically, the authors hope the proposed
new set of regulations will reflect the standard-based
system envisioned by the then Environmental Council
of Zambia (ECZ) some twenty years ago;9 i.e. (i) the
need to develop sector-specific guidelines for preparing
EIAs;10 (ii) the need to continue improving
professional competence of personnel involved in
undertaking EIAs;11 (iii) the need for legislation to
ensure economic and political independence in EIA
assessments;12 (iv) the need to review the quality and
level of public participation especially in deriving
management options;13 (v) the need to develop a set
of priority indicators based on environmental physical,
chemical or biological measures,14 and (vi) the need
for the regulations to incorporate a review stage in the
EIA process, during which independent experts give
their point of view in respect to the EIA of any
project,15 and (vii) the need for the ECZ and
authorizing agents to initiate review and monitoring
of projects that have entered implementation stage.16
2.1 Environmental Management 
Act 2011
The spirit of EIAs in Zambia derives from the general
object of  the Environmental Management Act No.12
of 2011 (herein truncated as EMA); to promote




8 Two of  the functional principles of  environmental
management upon which the Environmental
Management Act, 2011, is founded.
9 ECZ, State of the Environment in Zambia 2000










SUBJECTIVITY IN THE STATUTORY
FOUNDATIONS OF EIAs IN ZAMBIA
integrated environmental management, to protect and
conserve the natural environment and to promote
sustainable management of natural resources.17 EIAs
are also conceived as tools for prevention and control
of pollution and environmental degradation.18 EIAs
are designed to provide an avenue for public
participation in environmental decision-making and
access to environmental information while
establishing baselines for environmental monitoring
and auditing.19 It is within this logic that EIAs in
practice are designed to be an enforcement and
implementation mechanism for the precautionary and
prevention principles of environmental law; the two
principles which, if effectively enforced and
implemented, guarantee the safety of the public from
negative effects of development projects in attaining
the right to a safe, clean and healthy environment.20
Essentially, the precautionary and prevention principles
are directing principles with an objective to realize the
right to a safe environment, failure to which, they
become political slogans for achievement of
ambiguous policy goals.21 The precautionary and
prevention principles are defined in Article 255 of the
Constitution of Zambia as;
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage to the environment, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason
for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation [the
precautionary principle];22 origin, quality,
methods of  production, harvesting and
processing of natural resources shall be
regulated23
A much more elaborate definition of the principle of
prevention is enacted in the EMA as:
Adverse effects shall be prevented and
minimized through long-term and integrated
planning and the coordination, integration and
co-operation of efforts, which consider the
entire environment as a whole24
While scientific certainty and/or a lack of it underpins
the precautionary principle, planning and decision-
making underpins the principle of prevention. Should
the determination of environmental risk using
scientific certainty and/or a lack of it, and should the
planning and decision-making upon which
environmental risk management is based be subjective
and controversial matters, the effectiveness of the
precautionary and preventative principles in practice
becomes contestable. Ordinarily, therefore, EIA rules
are expected to enforce a scientific based approval
system in order to cure subjectivity that may come
with determination of environmental risk and the
planning and decision-making that are attendant to it.
Inevitably, scientific certainty, planning and decision-
making such pivotal elements in the enforcement of
the precautionary and prevention principles that the
entire EIA process and practice revolve around the
two elements.
As such, in section 29, the law prohibits undertaking
any project that may have an impact on the
environment without written approval of the Zambia
Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA – herein
referred to as the Agency).25 The legal form of the
term ‘may’ have an impact signifies the uncertainty
that comes with prediction and determination of
environmental risks in practice. It throws, especially,
the application of the precautionary principle into
subjective political, economic, ecological and cultural
contestations.26 This can be evinced from the effect of
the provision in practice that that the law does not
necessarily prohibit projects but only prohibits them
if they do not have written approval. As such, the
approval itself must be based on an accurate or
scientifically sound basis of predicting and determining
environmental risks. The safeguard, therefore, comes
with the stringency of conditions set out in the approval
Law, Environment and Development Journal
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21 Nicolas De Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From
Political Slogan to Legal Rules (Oxford University Press
2002) 255-256.
22 The Constitution of Zambia (n 2), Art 255(c).
23  ibid Art 255(j).
24  The Environmental Management Act No.12, 2011, s6
(b).
25 ibid s29 (1).
26 De Sadeleer (n 21) 256.
according to the second part of subsection 1 of section
twenty-nine.
Subsection 2 makes the regulatory instruments clear;
the approval must come in form of a license or permit
in which conditions are stipulated dictating how to
proceed with the approved project. These conditions
are the hallmark of EIA regulations to be analyzed
further in the proceeding discussion. But in subsection
3, the Agency may delegate its approval functions to
an appropriate authority. In theory, the delegated
authority holds the scientific expertise to be relied upon
in deciding the matter under review. The practice,
however, is different. Meanwhile, the legal form of
subsection 4 demonstrates the foundation of
subjectivity in this approval:
The Agency shall not grant an approval in
respect of a project if the Agency ‘considers’
that the implementation of the project would
bring about adverse effects or that the
mitigation measures may be inadequate to
satisfactorily mitigate the adverse effects of the
proposed project.
The logic of subsection 4 implicitly posits that
proposed projects do not come with an inherent risk
of adverse effect on the environment. But this risk is
inherently associated with how the project is planned
to be implemented. As such, environmental risk lies
with the implementation of the proposed project and
not with the nature and scope of the project itself.
This is already a subjective matter from ecological,
economic, political and cultural perspectives of the
many Zambians who may be interested in, and affected
by, a proposed development project. This should
explain the phrasing of the foundational section 29 in
which the law prohibits undertaking any project that
‘may’ have an impact on the environment without
written approval of  the Agency. Essentially, project
approval is based on how the Agency ‘considers’ the
implementation design of a proposed project, and
not necessarily the scientific certainty that can gleaned
from the nature and scope of the project itself against
a particular environment. This premise became an
important basis of legal argument in the EIA case of
Zambia Community Based Natural Resource
Management Forum and other vs the Attorney
General and Mwembeshi Resources Limited - as the
second defendant successfully argued that: ‘[t]here is
no law that prevented a party from being issued with
a mining license before completion of an EIA. What
was forbidden was to commence mining operations
before the EIA’.27
From the foregoing legal argument, the project
proponent only needs to prove, in pre-approval theory,
that their practices vis-à-vis project operation will be
conducted in such a way that it significantly reduces or
eliminates the risk of causing adverse effects on the
environment during its operation. From regulatory
ethos, the prediction and determination of whether a
proposed project ‘may’ have adverse effects on the
environment is subjective if not based on scientific
certainty. Ordinarily, EIA regulations, being a set of
detailed rules enforcing the statutory object in practice,
are expected to cure the subjectivity wrought in the
statutory legal text.
As was rightly held by the judge in the case cited, EIAs
are widespread public interest matters.28 They
inevitably provoke public conflicts of interests,
contestations and grievances especially after approval.
As such, the judge held that this was enough reason
to believe that such matters needed to be determined
on their merits.29 Reference to ‘merit’ in this case hinged
on the plausibility of scientific certainty regarding the
reality of a causal link between the proposed project
activities and the negative effects such activities would
cause on the complainants, the surrounding
communities and on the environment in general.
Recognizing the public-interest nature of EIAs, legal
drafters saw it fit to provide, in subsection 5, a
procedural right to any persons aggrieved with the
granting or refusal to grant an approval under the law
to, within fourteen days of  that decision, lodge an
appeal in accordance with Part X. The part X appeal
system revolves around three processes; firstly, the
aggrieved may apply to the board of  the Agency for
review of the decision or direction within thirty days;30
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27 Zambia Community Based Natural Resource Mana-
gement Forum and Five others vs the Attorney General
and Mwembeshi Resources Limited, 2014/HP/A.006,
April 2014, pg 15.
28 ibid 8.
29 ibid 12.
30 The Environmental Management Act, s112.
implementation of the precautionary and prevention
principles of  environmental law. The exercise of  this
ministerial discretion in practice strangles the
precautionary principle at its birth. As such, it turns
the EIA process into a subjective, controversial and
highly contested system on the part of those that do
not agree with the Minister - the very reason why
matters are escalated to the High Court of Zambia, in
the hope that the courts will cure the subjectivity in the
EIA approval. Yet the courts must adjudicate these
matters by reference to the very statute that originate
the subjectivity.
While section 29 of the EMA generally provides and
defines the normative culture of EIAs in Zambia,
section 30 empowers the Minister to make regulations
for the effective administration of Strategic
Environmental Assessments (SEA) and EIAs. These
regulations are meant to categorize projects which are
considered to have an effect on the environment, and
those which are required mandatorily to conduct an
EIA.35 Ostensibly, the spirit of  section 30 is to limit
subjectivity in the approval process by creating some
guiding criteria of indicators which EIA statutory
regulations must enforce in practice.
2.2 Mines and Minerals Devel-
opment Act 2015 and S.I No. 29
of 1997
EIAs in the Mines and Minerals Development Act
2015 are specifically tailored to regulate safety, health
and environmental protection in mining operations.36
It borrows its substantive definition of EIA from
the EMA as the principal legislation on environmental
matters in general and on EIAs in particular. As such,
the Directors of Mines Safety and the Agency may
cause such impact studies to be carried out when
considered necessary.37
EIAs in mining operations are regulated by a principle
norm that the exploitation of minerals shall ensure
safety, health and environmental protection.38 This
principle has a material effect on the approval of mining
secondly, and given that the board may dismiss the
application for review under section 113, the aggrieved
may appeal to the Minister who also may dismiss or
consider the appeal, and the Minister may also refer
the application or appeal back to the board;31 and
thirdly, any person not satisfied with the Minister may
appeal to the High Court of Zambia.32
Problems begin when the Minister fails, for whatever
reasons, to settle grievances against an EIA approval,
and refers the matter back to the board of the Agency
who, in the first place, may have given an unsatisfactory
verdict which prompted the aggrieved persons to
appeal to the Minister. Secondly, the process becomes
controversial when the Minister disregards the scientific
findings and recommendations of the person(s)
assigned to conduct an inquiry. Rightly so, the law
makes it clear that such inquiry findings and
recommendations are not peremptory and cannot be
binding on the Minister.33 In essence, the Minister is
not under an obligation to heed the findings or
recommendations of the inquiry notwithstanding the
fact that this may be an expert-based scientific inquiry.
The legality of this provision was interpreted literally
and upheld by High Court stating that ‘[t]he Minister
of Lands is not bound by findings and
recommendations of the person conducting the
inquiry when determining an appeal or review’.34
On the one hand, there is a legally weak caveat
safeguarding the Minister’s potential abuse of
statutory powers by directing that the Minister shall
have regard to the purpose of the Act in determining
any application for review. But on the other hand, the
Minister shall not be bound by the expert opinion
expressed in the inquiry recommendations. The
Ministerial discretion to disregard expert
recommendation sits at odds with the precautionary
principle whose bedrock is scientific certainty and/or
lack of  it in decision-making. In practice, therefore, the
Ministerial discretion to disregard expert scientific
inquiries, findings and/or recommendations shutters
the fulcrum of  scientific certainty, planning and
decision-making in the enforcement and
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31  ibid s115.
32 ibid s116.
33 ibid s115 (2) c.
34 Zambia Community Based Natural Resource Management
Forum (n 27) 15.
35 Environmental Management Act, s30 (2) a.
36 The Mines and Minerals Development Act No.7 of
2015, preamble.
37 ibid s80 (2).
38 ibid s4 (c).
operations; so grave that a mining license cannot be
issued, and effectively, mining operations cannot be
permitted without prior satisfactory EIA approval
from the Agency.39 Further, the role of  the Director
of Mines Safety in EIAs is bound by section 39 of
EMA which enacts that; an appropriate authority shall
not issue or grant any license, permit or any other
authorization for the doing of any activity by any
person, which may have an adverse effect on the
environment, before the appropriate authority first
consults the Agency as to whether the issuing or grant
of the license, permit or other authorization will have
an adverse effect on the environment.
Unlike the EIA process under the EMA and its
attendant regulations, the mining-EIA process makes
peremptory rules in respect of who qualifies to conduct
an EIA in practice.40  This plays a crucial gate-keeping
role regulating the entry into EIA professional practice
and conduct – a missing link in the ZEMA EIA
regulations which has been a subject of controversial
contestations. The Mining-EIA regulations require
qualified scientists to conduct scientific studies as part
of the specialized Mining-EIA.41 The enforcement
and implementation of the precautionary and
prevention principles in this case cannot be contested.
The requirement for environmental scientists to
conduct scientific studies upon which planning and
decision-making should be based significantly reduces
room for subjective approvals and decision-making
in the mining-EIAs. As such, the Mines and Minerals
Development Act and its concomitant EIA regulations
are not subject of this analysis.
2.3 Environmental Protection and
Pollution Control Act 1990
The repealed Environmental Protection and Pollution
Control Act (herein truncated as EPPCA) contains no
specific provisions to establish EIA as a legal/
regulatory mechanism for environmental protection
and pollution control. Section 96, however, provides
for the Minister’s discretionary powers to make
regulations, by statutory instrument, for anything
which had to be prescribed under the Act for the
protection of any aspect of the environment and for
the control of pollution in the environment. The
current EIA regulations in force (the EIA Regulations,
S.I No.28 of  1997) derive from this provision yet they
remain in force by virtue section 15 of the
Interpretations and General Provisions, Chapter Two
of the Laws of Zambia.42 The regulations derive their
subsidiary authority from the exercise of powers
contained in sections 6 and 96 of the EPPCA. Section
6 establishes functions of the Environmental Council
of Zambia (ECZ the Council) under which the
Council was mandated to, inter alia, conduct studies
and make recommendations on standards relating to
the improvement of the environment and
maintenance of a sound ecological system. In effect,
the theoretical aspirations of the EIA regulations are
defined by, and derive from, the repealed EPPCA, the
practical effects of EIA are envisioned from the spirit
of EMA. But while there is no illegality regarding such
arrangements according to the Laws of Zambia, the
EIA regulations in practice presents lacunas,
weaknesses and inconsistencies associated with the very
reasons why the EPPCA was repealed and replaced in
the first place. The discussion now narrows down to
examine the EIA regulations and the process it
establishes in detail.
3
EIA REGULATIONS, PROCESS AND
PRACTICE
3.1 The EIA Regulatory Frame-
work
The EIA review process is regulated by the
Environmental Protection and Pollution Control
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39 ibid s25 (a).
40 The Mines and Minerals (Environmental) Regulations,
S.I No. 29 of  1997, reg 4.
41 ibid reg 3(b).
42 Where any Act, Applied Act or Ordinance or part
thereof is repealed, any statutory instrument issued
under or made in virtue thereof shall remain in force,
so far as it is not inconsistent with the repealing written
law, until it has been repealed by a statutory instrument
issued or made under the provisions of such repealing
written law, and shall be deemed for all purposes to
have been made thereunder.
(Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, S.I
No 28 of 1997 (herein referred to as the EIA
Regulations). The process begins with submission of
six copies of a complete project brief to the Agency
according to regulation 5. The project is then
transmitted to the authorizing agency within seven
days for comments. If the Agency is satisfied that the
project will have no significant impact on the
environment, or that the project discloses sufficient
mitigation measures to ensure ‘acceptability’ of the
anticipated impacts, the Agency shall, within forty days
of receiving the project brief from the developer, issue
a decision letter, with conditions as appropriate, to the
effect, to the authorizing agency.43 While the meaning
of ‘acceptability’ in this context is the key basis for
decision-making, there is no scientific criteria outlined
within the regulatory process and in practice to
determine ‘acceptability’. What is presented in both
EIA process on paper and in practice is that the
developer only needs to outline sufficient mitigation
measures against the predicted impacts in order to
guarantee approval of the project brief. As the case is,
it is the developer who predicts, calculates, assesses
and determines environmental risk and presents to
the Agency together with what the developer proposes
as mitigation measures.
This logic in the EIA process has a significant
relationship to the conscious or unconscious
conception environmental risk implicit in the drafters’
minds – that environmental risk comes with the
implementation of the project and not necessarily
inherent in the nature and scope of the project idea as
it relates to the type of environment in which the
project is to be operated. This reduces opportunities
for relying on scientific certainty for planning and
decision-making on the part of the Agency mandated
to enforce and implement the precautionary principle.
The members of public who dispute this logic, seeing
it as illogical against the precautionary principle,
undertake all necessary steps to contest what they view
as controversial EIA approvals arising out of this logic.
The claim of the appellants (being a group of
environmental organizations) in the Zambia
Community Based Natural Resources Management
Law, Environment and Development Journal
Forum EIA High Court case was fundamentally
premised on this argument.44
But where the Agency determines that the project is
likely to have significant impacts on the environment,
it shall require that an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) be prepared in accordance with the
regulations, and shall inform the developer accordingly
within forty days of receiving the project brief from
the developer.45 Following the sequential order of
regulations five to seven, a project brief is the primary
document upon which the Agency determines whether
a project satisfies the ‘acceptability’ threshold to
proceed with a project brief or to be subjected to an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In practice,
this is an expensive undertaking for Second Schedule
projects (Large scale projects requiring an EIA under
regulation 7) owing to the fact that every project must
first develop a project brief before the Agency can
determine, from that brief, whether the project requires
to be subjected to a full EIA or not. To avert the huge
cost that come with such a requirement, project
developers and their EIA consultants use their
discretionary judgements to decide, by themselves,
whether their projects require a project brief (under
the First Schedule) or a full EIA under the Second
Schedule. This has yet raised questions – in whose
powers does the decision to undertake a Project Brief
or full EIA lie? In the EIA regulations, it is clearly the
Agency, based upon the scrutiny of  a Project Brief.
But in practice, the project developers and their EIA
consultants make the decision.
Rightly so, developers and their EIA consultants are
guided by the two regulatory Schedules provided by
the Agency to determine which projects need a Project
Brief and which ones require a full EIA. On the one
hand, regulations 5 to 7 are peremptory mandating all
projects to start with a Project Brief which, according
to both the explicit definition of  ‘Project Brief ’46 and
the spirit of regulation 7, is the first step in the EIA
48
43 Environmental Protection and Pollution Control
(Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations, S.I
No.28 of  1997, reg 6(2).
44 Zambia Community Based Natural Resources Man-
agement Forum and Five others (n 27) pg 3-4.
45 EIA Regulations (n 43) reg 7.
46 Project Brief means a report made by the developer
including preliminary predictions of possible impacts
of a proposed project on the environment and
constituting the first stage in the environmental impact
assessment process.
process irrespective of the nature and scope of the
proposed project. On the other hand however, the
First and Second Schedules explicitly guide the
developers to judge their own projects regarding
whether such projects require a mere Project Brief or a
full EIA. At the same time, the determination of
whether a project requires a Project Brief or full EIA is
the discretion of the Agency based on the assessment
of the ‘acceptability’ of predicted environmental risks
and their impacts in the submitted Project Brief,
according to regulation 7.
For those projects requiring a full EIA, part IV of the
EIA regulations outlines a detailed review process in
which the developer is required to submit twelve copies
of  the EIS to the Agency.47 The twelve copies are
meant to be distributed to a host of interested and/
or affected stakeholders outlined in regulation 16 such
as; the relevant ministries, local government units,
parastatals, non-governmental and community-based
organizations, all of which, are not required to conduct
their own independent scientific assessments against
the proposed project, but only required to comment
on the submitted EIS based on their own opined
perspectives. The submitted EIS is entered into a
registry of EIAs and within seven days, the Agency
transmits a single copy of the EIA to the authorizing
agency for comments.48 The authorizing agency or
another authority the Agency is working with has the
discretion to carry out such procedures as deemed
appropriate. In the spirit of the precautionary and
prevention principles, it would ordinarily be expected
that such procedures be independent scientific
assessments to provide checks and balances against
the developers’ assessments and prediction of
environmental risk and impacts in the submitted EIS.
But in practice, the other authorizing agencies only
offer comments based on their opinions regarding
their perspective of the proposed project after reading
the submitted copy of the EIS as required under
regulation 15.
Should the developer’s EIS be rejected based on
opinions of other authorizing agencies, the developer
has legitimate grounds to challenge such a decision; to
argue that his/her project has been rejected based on
opinions rather than scientific assessment. Such an
argument become even stronger when the developer
presents the best available technology to substantiate
the scientific certainty which the Agency and other
authorizing agencies may not be able to provide in
justification of the precautionary principle.
Should such contentious issues arise at a preliminary
stage of EIA process, the Agency has a discretion to
organize or cause to organize public hearings in the
locality of the proposed project.49 According to
regulation 17, the Agency shall consider the EIS and
all comments it has received under regulations 15 and
16 to determine whether to issue a decision letter in
accordance with regulation 21 (issue of letter of
decision by the Agency) if the Agency is of the ‘opinion’
that it will reach a fair and just decision through a
public hearing,50 or if the Agency considers it necessary
to protect the environment.51 In the said public
hearings, the Agency shall appoint a person who, in its
opinion, is qualified to preside over the public hearing
and who shall serve on such terms and conditions as
may be agreed between the Council and the person so
appointed.52 The person appointed to preside over
the public hearing shall, within fifteen days from the
termination of the public hearing, make a report of
his findings to the Agency.53
A few concerns arise out of this process and the
seriousness of these concerns is seen in the practical
implications of EIA conduct:
Firstly, there is a high level of  discretionary judgements
that both the Agency and the other authorities have to
rely on. This discretion is created by the weak form of
the legal language used throughout the review process
such as – the use of ‘may’, ‘consider’ and ‘opinion’. It
weakens the bindingness of the process while creating
room for the Agency to rely on its own discretionary
opinions, administrative procedures and subjective
judgements.
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Secondly, and related to the first, the Agency does not
demonstrate its own independent technical/scientific
authority, capacity and strengths in assessing,
examining, monitoring and evaluating environmental
risks and impacts. Rather, the framework clearly dictates
the Agency’s reliance on; i) the comments of  other
authorizing agencies or authorities such as, the local
authorities and line Ministries in their comments: it is
not clear what happens if the other authorizing
agencies have a dissenting view opposed to the Agency’s
approval, ii) the developers’ own propositions in the
EIS or project brief, iii) comments and submissions
from public hearings, and iv) report of the appointed
person presiding over the public hearings.
While this may be a good sign of democratic
environmental governance in normative terms, it also
depicts the technical weaknesses of the Agency lacking
strong scientific standards in environmental decision-
making. This weakness creates regulatory subjectivity
evinced in EIA approval disputations and contested
decisions. If, as the case is, there is a technical committee
of reviewers the Agency relies on, the EIA regulations
do not outline the selection and criteria used to select
the members of that committee. What qualifications
should the reviewers possess seeing that EIAs arise
out more than thirty socio-technical, socio-
environmental and scientific specialties listed in the
First, Second and Third Schedules of the regulations
in tandem with regulations 3 and 7? These questions
are answered through the Agency’s administrative
procedures which does not cure the subjectivity in the
approval process, but reinforces it.
Thirdly, how does the Agency deal with all the public
comments it receives from an EIS? Administrative
practice shows that the Agency categorizes these
comments into what it deems crucial and those that
are considered more opinionated than technical.
Understandably, it is practically impossible to give equal
consideration to all the comments, as conflicting as
they may be, at any time. But if comments of a section
of interested and affected parties could be considered
and treated as less important ‘opinions’, what does
public participation mean to those whose comments
are judged ‘less important’? Experience also shows
that it is the section of the interested and affected
parties whose comments and views might have been
considered ‘less important’ who actually contest and
appeal against the Agency’s decisions even to the High
Court.
Fourthly, the professional conduct of  EIAs themselves
is increasingly becoming questionable. Unlike the
Mining-EIA regulations which are peremptory on the
environmental and mining scientists mandated to
conduct an EIA, including their qualifications and
experience, the ZEMA EIA process has grey areas in
this respect. The developer decides but does not
determine who should conduct their EIA according
to regulation 9. The developer submits names and
qualifications of persons that must prepare the EIS
but the Agency has a discretion to approve and/or
reject the proposed names without providing a criteria
for approving and/or rejecting the names of EIA
consultants. Further, the Agency gives justificatory
reasons for any rejection of proposed EIA consultants
but it is not mandated to provide justificatory rationale
for who qualifies to conduct an EIA.54 In the event
of rejected names, the Agency shall request that
another name be submitted for consideration, yet no
specifications are given as to what criteria such a counter-
proposed name should satisfy. In essence, the Agency
has an administrative, not a legal, discretion to decide
who should, and who should not, conduct EIAs in
Zambia.
3.2 Public Participation
Notwithstanding the fact that public participation lacks
a globally-agreed definition, it actually presents a
divergence of definitions, often contested, from a
plethora of perspectives.55 The Constitution of
Zambia does not provide a conceptual meaning of
public participation, neither does the EMA nor the
EIA Regulations themselves provide a statutory
working definition of public participation. It is helpful
enough for this analysis, however, that the
Constitution of Zambia, EMA and the EIA
regulations provide a clear conceptual perspective of
the value of public participation. This value is rooted,
firstly, in the normative perspective of  public
participation enshrined in Article 255 of the
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approval. The Zambia Community Based Natural
Resource Management Forum case61 typifies this
scenario - as the first five appellants represented a group
of environmental organizations who were not directly
affected by the proposed project. Meanwhile, the
perspective value of public participation in the EIA
Regulations is purely instrumental and contrasts the
purely normative perspective values of public
participation enshrined in the Constitution and in the
EMA.
Regulation 8 requires that a developer ensures that
public views are taken into account during the
preparation of  the Terms of  Reference for an EIS.
The use of the term ‘ensure’ is itself a weaker form of
legal language by which the developer is required to
show commitment or effort in incorporating public
views in their plans. As such, the compliance
requirement on the developer’s part is to simply
demonstrate ‘effort’ and show ‘commitment’ not a
substantively positive obligation to take public views
into account. In effect, the developer cannot be liable
for failure to take public views into account as the
provision only requires them to demonstrate effort,
as long as they are able to show that they did undertake
all practicable steps to do so.
In the final analysis, public participation is stripped
off its value and remains at the mercy (or at the
discretion) of  the developer’s ‘effort’ or ‘commitment’
rather than a substantively mandatory requirement to
take public views on board. This lacuna in the practice
of EIAs weakens the cogency of the Constitutional
normative perspective value of public participation and
as enacted in section 91 of  EMA. Effectively, the rules
reduce a statutory ‘normative right’ to an ‘instrumental
privilege’ at the mercy of  the developer’s effort, which
effort, has an emphasis on the instrumental perspective
value of  public participation, especially, the use of  public
participation for reflection and for rubber-stamping
legitimacy in the approval process. In empiricism, on
the one hand, both the normative and instrumental
perspectives of public participation are critiqued for
creating an ambiguity which does not outline what
public participation is purposed to achieve in practice.62
In regulatory ethos, on the other hand, this ambiguity
Constitution, i.e. effective participation of people in
the development of policies, plans and programs;56
secondly, in the normative perspective enacted as a right
to information which is intricately associated with the
right to be informed in section 91 of the EMA, and
thirdly, in the instrumental perspective of  regulation
10 of the EIA regulations.
The normative perspective value holds public
participation as an avenue for influencing decision-
making in environmental matters, to enhance the
democratic capacity and social learning of the interested
and affected parties.57 On the other hand, the
instrumental perspective value holds public
participation as an avenue for generating legitimacy in
the decision-making process, a conflict resolution
mechanism and a means of reflection in respect of
what benefits or risks a proposed project brings to the
fore?58 In practice, however, there is an ostensible
combination of the two perspective values in EIA.
This combination is somewhat an inevitable overlap
more for the sake of  augmenting each other’s’ goals
than to create an antagonism.59 But the challenge comes
when these two values clash in the approval process
and in the courts.
It is common knowledge that courts in Zambia rely
more on statutes [enacted with a strong normative
values of public participation] than on provisions of
the regulations [with an instrumental value]. Therefore,
when Honourable Justice Kondolo reiterated that an
EIA case whose magnitude revolved around a large-
scale mining operation evoked great public interest,60
he was indirectly referencing respect for both the
normative and instrumental values of public
participation vested in those members of public
interested in, and affected by, the proposed project.
But unlike the instrumental perspective, the normative
perspective drives even the people who are not directly
affected by the proposed project to contest an EIA
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prevents the codification of clear standards by which
to judge, and through which to enforce, public
participation.63
Ultimately, the meaning, value and effectiveness of
public participation in EIA decision-making is highly
contested on three fronts:  Firstly, to what extent are
public views, interests, opinions and concerns taken
into account; secondly, who makes and determines
the final approval of proposed projects when members
of the public express dissenting views against the
proposed project? And thirdly, there is contrast, in
both theory and practice, between the instrumental
value perspective in the letter of the EPPCA-based
EIA regulations of 1997 and the normative value
perspective in the Constitution and in the spirit of the
EMA with regards to public participation. Ultimately,
the instrumental value of public participation benefits
the legitimation of the developers’ approval more than
the normative values of the public.
3.3 Decision-making
Regulation 20 provides that, in making its final decision,
the Agency shall take into account the following: (i)
the impact predictions made in the environmental
impact statement, the predictions made by the
developers themselves; (ii) the comments made under
regulations 15 and 16; (iii) the report of the persons
appointed to preside over a public hearing as they
merely report on the comments gathered from the
public hearing, and (iv) where applicable, other factors
which the Agency considers crucial in the particular
circumstance of the project.
As already alluded to under the review process, the
Agency’s decision-making is highly subjective because
it is not based on scientific criteria but relies on
predictions of the developer, expert and lay opinions
and comments gathered from stakeholders in support
of, or in opposition to, the project, together with what
the Agency may consider crucial in the particular
circumstance of a project. While EIAs arise out of
scientific fields as stipulated in the three regulatory
Schedules, the approval process is itself not scientific
in tandem with the application of the precautionary
principle. Consequently, EIA approval decisions are a
reflection of subjective perspectives, opinions and
public comments, subjective and discretionary
judgements of the Agency and other authorizing
agencies. Ultimately, EIA invoke controversy,
contestations and a conflict of interests.
3.4 The Believer’s Perseverance 
Syndrome
Regulatory empiricism shows that values, norms and
belief systems have the strongest influence on
compliance.64 In fact, values, norms and beliefs
systems are so strong that they can be used as
instrumental and consensual bases for compliance
and/or non-compliance with the law.65 In the absence
of scientific criteria, peoples’ normative and
instrumental values, morals and belief systems inform
behaviour, which in turn, shapes and influences
decision-making.66 This is referred to as the Believer’s
Perseverance Syndrome, i.e. a tendency for people to
look primarily or exclusively for information that allows
them to confirm or prove their beliefs, morals,
normative or instrumental dispositions towards an
issue.67 Devoid of scientific criteria for decision-making,
the EIA process in Zambia relies on the Believer’s
Perseverance Syndrome in which the comments,
opinions, assumptions, predictions and perceptions
of  the Agency, members of  the public and
stakeholders, the developers’ EIS, comments and
opinions of the persons appointed to preside over
public hearings, and the Minister’s decision over EIA
conflicts, all depict conflicting values, morals and beliefs
of  different people including a minister’s political
views.
Therefore, while conflicts of interest, controversies and
disagreements are inevitable, who possesses the right
to judge another person’s value system, morals and
beliefs other than the judge in the courts of law?
Without objective EIA criteria upon which the courts
can rely to resolve conflicts, controversies and
disputations, the EIA process remains a subjective
63 ibid 165.
64 Tom Tyler, ‘Methodology in Legal Research’ (2007) 13(3)
Utrecht Law Review 130-141, 133.
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67  ibid 139.
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regulatory ethos. This explains why EIA cases lose
their substantive cogence when they appear before the
courts of  law. They change into the claimant’s and
defendant’s value arguments around whose values are
more at risk than the other: whose values and beliefs,
therefore, needs to be accorded judicial protection? At
this level, EIAs are no longer fundamentally about
enforcement and implementation of the precautionary
and prevention principles of environmental law for
environmental protection. Instead, EIAs become a
subjective authorization formality to legitimize the
developers’ proposed projects as opposed to
environmental protection.
Finally, using Julia Black’s regulatory criteria, the EIA
regulatory framework in Zambia fails in the following
areas; (i) instrument failure due to a reliance on
inappropriate regulatory instruments,68 (ii)
information failure due to lack of information about
the problems being regulated,69 evinced in the lack of
scientific criteria for decision-making; (iii)
implementation failure due to poor enforcement of
what is commanded,70 even the more reason why EIAs
need to be regulated by a professional body, and (iv)
motivation failure – meaning, those being regulated
are not motivated enough to comply with the rules
and can violate them without planning to do so.71
4
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to analyze the root of
controversial approvals in the EIA legal framework
of  Zambia, particularly, in the EIA rules as stipulated
in the Statutory Instrument No.28 of  1997. The paper
finds that the legal form and character of the EIA
rules, the lack of scientific criteria for evaluating
environmental risk in the proposed projects, and the
clear contrast in the perspective values of public
participation, create a subjective regulatory ethos. In
such a framework, normative and instrumental values,
ethics and belief systems become the lenses through
which people subjectively view an issue before them
based on their own world views to influence EIA
decisions. Without science forming the basis of
decision-making, EIA decisions are made subject to
the divergent perspectives, opinions and comments
which depict different, and often conflicting, values
systems of all the interested and affected stakeholders.
Ultimately, whose value system could be judged as
legitimate or illegitimate? On what grounds could such
normative and instrumental judgements be made?
This question is ultimately reserved for the High Court
judge to answer in the process of adjudicating the
myriad of value-based arguments that arise out of
EIA process.
In the practical essence, EIA controversies lose the
technical cogency of EIA as an enforcement and
implementation mechanism for the precautionary and
prevention principles of environmental law and
environmental management when they are presented
before the judge in litigation. Under the prevailing
regulatory ethos, the controversies and conflicts of
interest arising out of this process are not only
inevitable but understandable from the legal form of
the EIA rules. To a large extent, this problem reflects
the Agency’s scientific capacity weaknesses locked within
the framework of  EIA law, and particularly, the
Agency’s present failure to bench-mark itself  against,
and to meet, the robust standards of practice set
twenty years ago by the erstwhile Environmental
Council of Zambia.
It is hereby proposed, therefore, that EIA regulations
need not be amended but completely overhauled in
order to locate their primacy in the spirit of the
Constitution and the Environmental Management
Act, 2011. While it is appreciated that the process of
revising these rules is already under way, the risk of
carrying forward the mischief of Statutory Instrument
No.28, 1997, is as daunting as pouring old wine into
new skins while the essence of the old wine remains
the same. Therefore, the paper prays for the need to
cure the subjective regulatory culture at the centre of
the approval system. That the mischief is itself
characterized by the legal form, nature and character of
68 Julia Black, ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the
Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a Post-
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the rules, the development of new EIA rules should
ideally revolve around the legal form, nature and
character of the substantive rules themselves more
than a mere revision of regulatory instruments.
The EIA rules should be enforcing an approval
procedure whose fulcrum is a professional and
scientific standard of practice. This further highlights
two fundamental issues at play with the current EIAs
in Zambia; the EIA legal procedure as managed and
regulated by the Agency, and the EIA professional
practice as currently managed by nobody and sub-
optimally regulated by ZEMA. While ZEMA can
revise the EIA rules to cure the high level of subjectivity
in the approval process, pertinent questions will still
linger; who should conduct EIAs in Zambia, how
should they do it – what ethical, scientific and technical
issues should define this practice as professional? These
questions review subjective matters which, firstly,
ZEMA has shown considerable lack of capacity to
regulate; and secondly, as a consequence, they are
matters of professional conduct from which ZEMA
should rescues itself.
In addition, there is nothing within the current
regulatory framework that mandates the Agency to
regulate EIA professional practice. As the case is, the
Agency is an interested and affected party playing the
role of police, jury and judge in the approval process.
This is the source of  the often observed polarity that
frequently emerges between the propositions and
expectations of the developer and the demands of
interested and affected parties; a polarity which the
Agency often fails to manage. As a result, the EIA
process breaks down whenever an EIA expert and the
Agency fail to bridge the polarized gap between the
developer’s propositions and the expectations of
interested and affected stakeholders.
Foregoing, it would be a professional gesture for the
Agency to relinquish itself from issues of professional
practice and concentrate on regulating the legal process.
EIA practice should be regulated by a mandated
professional body in the same manner as lawyers,
doctors and engineers regulate their own professional
practice through the Law Association of Zambia
(LAZ), the Zambia Medical Association (ZMA) and
the Engineering Institute of Zambia (EIZ),
respectively. It should be the mandate of  the
professional body to establish professional standards
of practice around which licensed EIA practitioners
will base their scientific, technical and ethical practices.
The regulatory advantages such an approach brings to
the fore cannot be overemphasized as it provides a
decentric regulatory ethos which cures the empirically
flawed assumptions of the current EIA process.
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